Welcome to bgp2shell.

If you can see this page, our prefix has successfully propagated. The route is valid. The domain is registered. The vulnerability is still somewhere in transit. Further research is required.

edge-rtr-01 — ssh

edge-rtr-01# show ip bgp bgp2shell.com
BGP routing table entry for bgp2shell.com/32
Paths: (1 available, best #1)
  65535 64512 64496 i
    Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best
    Community: 65535:666 (NO_EXPLOIT)
    RPKI validation state: valid (the domain, anyway)

edge-rtr-01# show exploit summary
Neighbor        AS     State         PfxRcd
0day.invalid    65535  Idle          0
poc.invalid     65535  Active        0
cve.invalid     65535  Connect       0
% No exploit has reached Established state

edge-rtr-01# bash
% Invalid input detected at '^' marker.
edge-rtr-01#

Current status

Domain: Registered.
Logo: Ready. Has a little prompt in it.
Route: Announced. Accepted by at least one peer who wasn't paying attention.
Technical findings: The domain was available.
Shell: Not obtained. Withdrawn before it was ever advertised.
CVE: None. No vulnerability is being announced here, only a prefix.

Found the actual bug?

If you discover a genuine unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability reachable through BGP (a malformed UPDATE, a cursed path attribute, an OPEN message that opens a little too much), we'd be happy to hand this domain over to you.

You did the research, so you get the credit. We'll keep the domain receipt.

Request the domain →